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ALIVE AND WELL: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE
WELFARE STATE
ANITA L. ALLEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Professor Richard Epstein, the welfare state' is in-
imical to religious freedom. His perspective is at once radical and
traditional. It is radical in its suggestion that a sweeping rejection
of widely embraced and entrenched legislation would be necessary
to salvage religious freedom and eliminate difficulties inherent in
its jurisprudence. His perspective is traditional in its loyalty to
classical liberal concepts. However, because Epstein's well-known
libertarian interpretations of liberty, property and contract point
so uncompromisingly in the direction of the minimal night watch-
man state,' the traditional aspects of his perspective prove equally
radical as well.
Professor Epstein's paper contributes insight into familiar first
amendment dilemmas engendered by collective bargaining4 and
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., New College, 1974;
Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 1979; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. I would like to
thank Ms. Erin Mack and Ms. Jacqueline Bennett for their research assistance in preparing
this commentary.
1. A "welfare state" is a state in which the government is actively and paternalistically
involved in the economy. In particular, the term "welfare state" denotes the United States
since the economic depression of the 1930s, when the government began to take an "active
role in matters of public relief, welfare services, medical benefits, old age assistance, redis-
tributive and counter-cyclical spending, and a variety of domestic social functions." R.
WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE' WORLD
WAR II 320 (1988).
2. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375 (1990).
3. The minimalist or "night watchman" conception of government associated with liberta-
rian political philosophy takes a narrow view of the legitimate purposes of government. De-
fending bodily integrity and property rights are the essential functions of a government so
conceived. See, e.g., R NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 25-28 (1974). See generally R.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
4. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (congressional enact-
ment of National Labor Relations Act did not contemplate NLRB jurisdiction over paro-
chial schools refusing to recognize or bargain with lay teachers' unions.).
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employment discrimination,' but also gives his audience much with
which to disagree. This Comment amounts to a rejection of Ep-
stein's central claims. I argue that, in practice, the relationship be-
tween religious freedom and the welfare state is largely congenial
and mutually reinforcing, rather than hostile and contradictory.
II. THE TROUBLE EPSTEIN SEES
Epstein contends that when it comes to the constitutional pro-
tection of religious liberty, the contemporary Supreme Court is
trapped between a rock and a hard place. Efforts to protect reli-
gious liberty in employment have cast the Court against the "rock"
of majoritarian and egalitarian regulation, represented by the ap-
plication of collective bargaining statutes and antidiscrimination
laws to religious organizations. At the same time, efforts to protect
religious institutions from the requirements of regulation have
thrown the Court up against the "hard place" of the establishment
clause. Epstein argues that a constitutionally problematic state
subsidy of religion results when religious organizations are excused
on constitutional grounds from legislation routinely permitted to
burden their secular competitors.'
In other words, the Court faces a dilemma. It can treat religious
organizations differently in deference to the free exercise clause, or
it can treat them the same way secular organizations are treated
out of respect for the establishment clause. If the Court treats reli-
gious and secular organizations the same, free exercise of religion
under the Constitution becomes meaningless. If the Court treats
them differently, religious organizations are effectively subsidized,
rendering the anti-establishment provisions of the Constitution
meaningless. Viewed in this light, regulation of religion appears to
5. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding Title
VII prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of religion inapplicable to Mormon ter-
mination of employees who fail to qualify for church membership); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding that a Connecticut statute categorically prohibit-
ing termination of employees who refuse to work on their stated Sabbaths and providing no
business exceptions violates first amendment establishment clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment benefits under state statute may not be denied constitution-
ally to Seventh-Day Adventists refusing Saturday employment).
6. See supra notes 4, 5.
7. Epstein, supra note 2, passim.
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be unconstitutional, but failure to regulate religion appears to be
unconstitutional as well.
A. A Way Out
If the Court-first amendment jurisprudence, really-is stuck
between a rock and a hard place, how do we get it out? Epstein's
proposed escape hatch is to retreat from the welfare state. Specifi-
cally, he suggests that we get rid of majoritarian and egalitarian
labor laws. This would free religious organizations from legislation
that contradicts free exercise. It would also free American society
from the evil of state establishment of religion. Secular and reli-
gious organizations would operate in the same realm of freedom.
Epstein believes, however, that the escape route he proposes is
unlikely to find favor with the moderate and liberal mainstreams.
Epstein would dynamite what he views as the constrictive innova-
tions of the welfare state' in order to let constitutional and market
values flow freely. To let "our conception of religious liberty" flour-
ish, he says, we must free organized religion and secular enter-
prise.9 Whereas Thomas Jefferson stressed that the Constitution
erects a wall between church and state, 0 Epstein's Constitution
erects a wall between everything and state. Viewed from the main-
stream, the direction of Epstein's thinking is not only radically lib-
ertarian, it is wrong for reasons I will consider shortly.
Epstein argues that his proposed way out of the first amendment
dilemma is especially appropriate on at least two counts. First, "no
external or objective test demarcates religious freedom from the
8. Epstein maintains that, prior to the New Deal, the purpose of government was con-
ceived to be the protection of property and the freedom of contract. Antitrust, zoning, rent
control and land use laws were exceptions in place prior to "the 1937 watershed." Epstein,
supra note 2, at 375-76. In the realm of redistribution and public finance, progressive taxa-
tion and welfare for the poor had already been endorsed. Id. at 378.
The New Deal represented a constitutional regime that interpreted expansively the fed-
eral government's commerce clause powers and widened the scope of permissible labor regu-
lation open to state and federal authorities. Accordingly, "Congress had plenary power in
the economic sphere, including labor markets, as individual rights to resist such regulation
had eroded." Id. at 377. As for redistribution, the requirement that the taxed must benefit
specifically from the burden of taxation eroded with the New Deal. Id. at 378.
9. Id. at 375.
10. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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more mundane world of secular affairs""-no sharp divide exists
between the institutions and practices we call religious and those
we call secular. To challenge Epstein on this point, one might at-
tempt to come up with a plausible criterion for distinguishing reli-
gious activities from secular ones. The legendary difficulties of do-
ing so need not be rehearsed: Is a Christmas tree a religious or
seasonal symbol; is secular humanism a religion or a philosophy;
are sincere, but bizarre, new cults fads or infant religions?
Second, according to Epstein, religious tolerance and the free
market are both appropriate modern political responses to the
same moral reality.12 Lacking any other objective measure, the best
measure of value is the subjective preferences of individuals ex-
pressed through actual choices: preeminently, voluntary market
transactions. Each person must be free to pursue his or her own
conception of the good life. Thus, "[the] justification of religious
liberty depends upon the same subjective theories of value that
were once used to defend economic liberties more generally.' 3 Un-
surprisingly, therefore, the "dialogue over church and state" re-
flects the "principles of liberty and property that animated the re-
sistance to an unlimited state police power before 1937" and the
"concerns with redistribution through taxation.' 4
Epstein's second argument concerning the special propriety of
his proposed solution is more philosophical and hence more con-
troversial than his first. Epstein assumes that the best or only ar-
gument for religious tolerance is premised on a theory of value
akin to Hume's subjectivism 5 or Mill's utilitarianism. 16 Needless
to say, not everyone would agree with Epstein that there is no bet-
11. Epstein, supra note 2, at 379.
12. Id. at 386-88.
13. Id. at 379; cf. R. WUTHNOW, supra note 1, at 241-67 (common grounds for concepts of
religious freedom and economic freedom).
14. Epstein, supra note 2, at 378-79.
15. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 470 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1978)
("[M]orality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of .... "). But see, e.g., Moore, A
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 286 (1985) (interpretive
premises necessary to decide any case can and should be derived in part by recourse to the
dictates of "moral reality"); Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061 (discussing the
objectivity of moral judgment).
16. See J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 52-53 (G. Sher ed. 1907) ("[T]he sole evidence it is possi-
ble to produce that anything is desirable [and hence morally good] is that people do actually
desire it.").
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ter way to value human options than by appeal to what human
beings seem to want most. Nor would all agree that the underlying
normative arguments for religious and economic liberties are pre-
cisely the same.
17
B. Alternatives
Epstein is not the first to find contradiction and chaos in the
religion clauses and their jurisprudence."8 Nor is he alone in recog-
nizing that the welfare state has exacerbated certain tensions in
first amendment jurisprudence. 9
Few have concluded, however, that the tensions in first amend-
ment jurisprudence attributable to the welfare state warrant its
elimination. Typically, those who catch sight of Epstein's Scylla
and Charybdis react by throwing up their hands and concluding
that courts must and shall continue to do the best they can in bal-
ancing divergent interests-public and private, individual and in-
stitutional-while protecting the uncontroverted core of religious
practices. One difficulty with this approach, not at all unique to
religion clause jurisprudence, is the opacity of the mandate to bal-
ance interests. It is unclear precisely what task we are asking
courts to perform, and what norms ought to govern it. A further
difficulty is unique to this field. In the face of inevitable contro-
versy, it is unclear how we are to decide what constitutes the core
of religious practice.
Epstein denies that sanctuary can be found in judicially identi-
fied "cores" of religious practice.2 0 However, in great measure, pre-
vailing conceptions of religious liberty presuppose some such intui-
tive core. Thus, while Epstein's conception of religious liberty may
not have survived the welfare state, others' surely have. On one
familiar conception, freedom of religion is the liberty of belief and
17. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 247 (1986) (freedom of reli-
gion defended as an individual's inalienable right of conscience).
18. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1166-79 (2d ed. 1988); Special
Issue: Religion and the State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833 (1986).
19. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 826-28 (1st ed. 1978)("[1]n the age of the affirma-
tive and increasingly pervasive state, a less expansive notion of religion was required ... lest
all 'humane' programs of government be deemed constitutionally suspect.").
20. Epstein, supra note 2, at 401.
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conscience, strictly limited to self-regarding conduct.2' Religious
liberty is a modest-sized sphere of private association and self-
regarding conduct. It is not a far-reaching domain, free of state
intervention, in which other-regarding nonconforming conceptions
of the good life hold sway in the face of reasonable collective
opposition.
Yet Epstein is correct that a more individualized, "private con-
science" interpretation of religious freedom is descriptively out of
sync with widespread, conservative understandings of religion as
institutional, familial and evangelical.22 It is also out of line with
philosophical understandings of religious freedom, which have
often stressed that belief without the right to act on those beliefs is
an empty liberty.2 3 Because religious practice is and, to a degree,
should be allowed to be outward-reaching, an attack on Epstein
premised on the narrower conception of religion is problematic
from the beginning. Not plainly hopeless, but problematic.
Professor Laurence Tribe has sought to impose order in first
amendment jurisprudence by urging a unitary reading of the reli-
gion clauses as promoting values of church-state separatism and
participatory voluntarism. 4 Voluntarism, being more fundamental
in our liberal democracy, would have priority over separatism in
cases of conflict. Accompanying this unitary reading is a descrip-
tive analysis of the religion clauses as providing for spheres of per-
missible accommodation, spheres of required accommodation and
spheres of prohibited accommodation.
Although Tribe's descriptive analysis and unification proposal il-
luminate the source of chaos, they do not eliminate the tension
between the welfare state and free religion that concerns Epstein.
Nor do they tell us how to resolve controversies over how much the
welfare state may justifiably intrude, and whether courts have al-
lowed it to intrude too far. Viewed in this light, Tribe's approach
takes us but a little beyond the mandate to balance.
21. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 120-28, 1183-84 (judicial acceptance of belief-conduct/
belief-action distinction).
22. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 382-83.
23. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1184 (stating belief-action dichotomy is simplistic). But
see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (utilizing belief-action distinction).
24. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1160-62.
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Epstein's proposed solution to the welfare state's incursion into
religious freedom is surprisingly similar to Professor William P.
Marshall's proposed solution to the problems wrought by the con-
tradictory character of the religion clauses.2 5 Marshall has pro-
posed solving the problems of textual contradiction and jurispru-
dential chaos in the religion clauses by abandoning "a free exercise
analysis that allows for the creation of constitutionally compelled
free exercise exemptions from neutral laws of general applicabil-
ity" in favor of speech clause analysis.26 He maintains that the
speech clause has often governed and can continue to govern the
"degree of protection for such 'core' religious activities as prayer
and worship" and other types of religious activity as well.27 He ar-
gues that the elimination of the free exercise exemption would pro-
mote "doctrinal stability, clarification, and sensible results," while
also ending the need to inquire into the sincerity of religious belief
and the devaluation of secular belief in a world in which "secular
and religious belief systems" have similar roles and effects.
28
Interestingly, despite their differences, Marshall and Epstein's
proposed solutions to the chaos in religion clause jurisprudence
have the same net result: secular and religious parity. Both create
a kind of constitutional parity between religious and secular activ-
ity. Epstein's solution requires undoing the welfare state (a big
deal), whereas Marshall's solution requires merely shifting the fo-
cus of first amendment analysis in religion cases from the free ex-
ercise clause to the speech clause, as the courts have frequently
done anyway (a lesser, more palatable deal). Epstein might re-
spond that Marshall's solution fails to take the free exercise clause
seriously as a norm and interpretative constraint. Marshall might
25. See Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Ex-
emption, 40 CASE W. RES. - (forthcoming 1990); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It":
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Marshall, Solving
the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
26. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemp-
tion, supra note 25, at -
27. Id. at - Marshall acknowledges but rejects criticism that his argument (1) "turns the
free exercise clause into a textual redundancy," (2) ignores the historiography of the religion
clauses, (3) ignores the respects in which "the application of neutral regulations creates its
own inequality," (4) ignores the pluralist advantages of a vigorous reading of the free exer-
cise clause, and (5) ignores the special nature and meaning of religion to believers. Id. at -
28. Id. at -
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reply that his solution does take the free exercise clause seriously,
just not literally.
III. A COUNTERARGUMENT
Epstein's argument about the fate of religious liberty faces a ma-
jor, complex counterargument. My counterargument has three
parts or stages. First, the contradictory character of the free exer-
cise and establishment clauses predates the welfare state and did
not cause it. Second, direct conflicts between welfare legislation
and freedom of religion are more episodic and theoretical than
commonplace and actual. Moreover, although the enactment of
welfare state legislation created new contexts for first amendment
controversy and may have heightened established tensions in first
amendment jurisprudence, it did so for the sake of compelling re-
forms, reforms for which, in some instances, religious activists and
organizations had assiduously labored. The belief that these re-
forms were constitutionally, as well as morally or pragmatically
compelling, hinges on the interpretative claim that first amend-
ment liberties are not absolute and permit limited legislative inter-
ference to secure individuals' basic economic well-being. Third,
welfare state reforms and religious freedom have enjoyed an over-
whelmingly peaceful coexistence. In fact, freedom of religion has
flourished in the American welfare state.
A. Stage One
Epstein concedes the first stage of the counterargument when he
admits that textual tensions and contradictions between the free
exercise and establishment clauses preceded the welfare state.2"
His own examples illustrate that before 1937 certain social and ec-
onomic regulations touching religious practices strained efforts to
maintain a jurisprudentially cogent wall between church and
state. 30
29. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 383-84.
30. See id. at 385-86. One of the cases he discusses in this connection is Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding polygamy ban).
[Vol. 31:409
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B. Stage Two
Epstein does not concede stage two of the counterargument.
Stage two rejoins that the welfare state has interfered with consti-
tutional freedom of religion, but for good and constitutionally com-
pelling reasons. Stage two represents the perspective of those who
view the economic interests protected by collective bargaining and
Title VII as paramount; they characterize the resulting interfer-
ence with religious freedom as partial, indirect or minor, and thus
constitutionally defensible.
From the point of view of constitutional theory, several
responses are open to Epstein. He can assert, implausibly in our
jurisprudence, that first amendment religious liberty is absolute,
admitting no exceptions of policy or principle.3' Yet on this fanci-
ful rendering, any legislative enactment compromising religious
freedom to the slightest degree would be, to that degree,
unconstitutional.
Alternatively, Epstein can agree that first amendment freedoms
are not absolute, but disagree that the economic "needs"-as op-
posed to "rights"-of labor, women or minorities are compelling.
Indeed, the notion that mere "needs" could be morally and consti-
tutionally compelling reasons to limit liberty is incompatible with
the libertarian tenets Epstein" embraces.32 Finally, Epstein can
agree that first amendment freedoms are not absolute, but disagree
as an empirical matter whether putatively ameliorative welfare leg-
islation actually assists targeted beneficiaries. In this vein, the
gains for white and black women that liberals attribute to Title
VII, conservatives will commonly attribute to gains in market
productivity."
31. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
If, therefore, the decision of the [state] Court is to withstand appellant's
constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a
beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights
of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appel-
lant's religion may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation
of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate . . .
Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
32. See generally R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
33. See generally P. BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS 125-26, 150-51, 167-68
(1985).
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In his paper, Epstein was not content to defend his stance
against welfare legislation on legal grounds. He did not limit him-
self to arguments that the legislation he opposes is, for example,
irreconcilable with the bare text or intent of the first amendment,
or judicial precedent. He reached deeper to make his case. Conse-
quently, stage two of the proposed counterargument and Epstein's
likely responses to it implicate perennial philosophical debates
over constitutional interpretation, the legitimacy of government re-
distribution and the entailments of having and protecting rights.
As previously mentioned, even meta-ethical debates over the sub-
jectivity of values play a role in Epstein's argument and replies to
it.
By way of political philosophy, Epstein characterizes religious
liberty as the freedom to do what one likes in the name of sincere
religiosity, within a perimeter of mutually consistent rights, such
as property and liberty short of force or fraud, without having to
justify choices so made to any other individual.34 Coercive govern-
mental interference with religious freedom is governed by rules
"designed to preserve and advance individual and subjective con-
ceptions of value." 5 These rules permit policing and paternalism
by government through measures calculated "to prevent [total] co-
ercion" by anyone and to "secure social arrangements that cannot
be brought about by consent, but only when the persons coerced
are made better off .... "36
So conceived, religious liberty is just a special case of constitu-
tionally protected moral liberty generally. The Constitution con-
templates various overlapping spheres of appropriately private,
nongovernmentally controlled conduct, of which religious belief is
but Qne. Within these private spheres, individual rather than col-
lective conceptions of the good life are determinative. One compli-
cation is that private groups as well as private individuals are con-
stitutionally protected in the name of freedom of association and
religion. Indeed, some of the cases most interesting to Epstein are
34. Epstein, supra note 2, at 384.
35. Id. at 387.
36. Id.
[Vol. 31:409
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those in which the leadership of organized religious groups seek
constitutional exemption or powers.37
David A. J. Richards' work emphasizes a theme of constitutional
tolerance, linking the jurisprudence of free religion, free speech
and decisional privacy.38 All three freedoms are prima facie re-
quirements of respect for the moral independence of rational per-
sons. 9 By comparison, Epstein sees common justifications for
these broad spheres of private conduct as well; but when it comes
to tolerating individual preferences, he sees private enterprise as
no less justified and sacrosanct than religion or sexual privacy.
Consequently for Epstein, the needs-based and egalitarian eco-
nomic intervention of the welfare state that many applaud is an
outrageous interference with moral rights.
Because provable or objective standards of value are lacking, our
political institutions ought to rely upon the most functionally relia-
ble indicator of human value, namely, what individuals value de
facto, as expressed in their market preferences. 40 He urges that in-
dividuals ought to have a right to decide for themselves how they
shall live, both when it comes to economic and commercial life,
and when it comes to religious life. His opponents, as reflected in
stage two of the proposed counterargument, insist that limitations
on liberty are sometimes warranted to achieve redistributive and
egalitarian ends. In my view, failure to limit liberty in this way
works to arbitrarily overvalue the preferences of some and under-
value the preferences of others who lack the material basis for full,
meaningful participation in politics, social life and the economy.
C. Stage Three
While stage two of the counterargument reduces to a series of
philosophical debates, stage three reduces to mainly empirical de-
bates. The thrust of this final stage is that religion is alive and well
in the American welfare state.
37. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
38. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
39. Id. at 243-44.
40. Epstein, supra note 2, at 387.
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By all appearances, religion is thriving in the United States to-
day.41 Epstein fears otherwise, but he does not indicate by what
standard he measures the impact of the welfare state on religious
liberty. He seems to base his claim of adverse impact solely on the
existence of a relatively small number of lawsuits and an even
smaller number of Supreme Court cases in which plaintiffs have
alleged interference with religious liberty.2
Strictly speaking, one cannot quantify religious freedom to mea-
sure whether it has increased or decreased since the rise of the wel-
fare state.43 However, one should be prepared to conclude that reli-
gious liberty is in serious trouble in the era of welfare legislation if
there is evidence of widespread governmental or government-
tolerated acts of repression of religion. Because the concept of re-
pression carries so much normative freight, however, an even bet-
ter basis for concluding that religious liberty is in trouble is evi-
dence that religion is less pervasive or less diverse now than prior
to the New Deal.
One point is beyond cavil. Religion is pervasive and diverse in
the United States today.44 Whether it is more pervasive and more
diverse now than before 1937 is a more difficult question.45 A
41. See, e.g., YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN & CANADIAN CHURCHES (C. Jacquet, Jr. ed. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinburger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. Annual statistics, however, on changes in church attendance, church membership,
number of clergy, enrollment in seminaries, new church construction and annual giving to
churches are suggestive. Also suggestive is the rate of new religions or religion-sponsored
groups formed for worship, charity, community services or public reform. YEARBOOK OF
AMERICAN & CANADIAN CHURCHES, supra note 41.
44. See generally R. WUTHNOW, supra note 1, at 20-25.
45. Decline in church attendance and other plausible indicia of institutional and spiritual
decline have led some commentators to conclude that religion is less pervasive today than it
was in the 1930s. See generally B. BECKWITH, THE DECLINE OF U.S. RELIGIOUS FAITH 1912-
1984 39-40 (1985) ("Gallup polled U.S. adults on church or synagogue membership repeat-
edly from 1936 to 1980, and reported an almost steady decline from 77% in 1936 to 69% in
1980."); cf. W. ROOF & W. McKINNEY, AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION: ITS CHANGING SHAPE
AND FUTURE 148-50 (1987) (membership in mainline churches declined, but decline appears
to have bottomed out); Roof & McKinney, Denominational America and the New Religious
Pluralism, 480 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 24, 27 (1985) (three major religious
groups, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish, experienced decline in religious participation in
1970s and 1980s). At the same time:
1. Americans continue to identify with the historic religious traditions. ...
90 percent of the population expresses a religious preference and two-thirds
are members of a local church or synagogue. ...
[Vol. 31:409
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twenty-five year proliferation 46 of new,4" and sometimes controver-
sial religions4s is evidence of increased diversity. Moreover, tradi-
tional, mainstream religions have begun to open their doors and
leadership to women 49 and ethnic minorities 50 who were formerly
excluded. These trends toward diversification on the levels of both
practice and participation suggest that in one important respect
more religious freedom exists today than before 1937.51
Just possibly, as a result of Title VII and collective bargaining
legislation, more religious freedom obtains for more individuals, in-
cluding the religious freedom not to practice a religion or to modify
religious traditions to suit one's individual taste. I would conjec-
ture that union membership has left workers freer to adopt unpop-
ular life styles and to express beliefs in and practice religions of
which employers disapprove. Better wages and shorter hours un-
doubtedly position wage laborers to donate more time and money
to their churches, synagogues or other religious organizations. Title
VII gave a comparable vitality to the women's movement, and the
2. For Americans, religious groups continue to fulfill important quasi-ethnic
functions providing millions with a sense of meaning and belonging....
3. Religious themes have taken on new significance in the public arena ....
Id. at 25-26.
46. See J. MELTON, A DIRECTORY OF RELIGIOUS BODIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1977); J.
MELTON & R. MOORE, THE CULT EXPERIENCE: RESPONDING TO THE NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
7-28 (1982) (1,500 religious bodies exist in the United States, including 600 alternative reli-
gions--"quantum leap" in religious pluralism in 1970s).
47. J. MELTON, supra note 46, at 7-15 (identifying 1,275 churches, sects, denominations
and cults and showing dramatic increases in number of new religious bodies between 1950s
and 1970s).
48. See generally Colloquium-Alternative Religions: Government Control and the First
Amendment, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1979-80).
49. See Steinfels, Woman Wins Approval to be Episcopal Bishop, N.Y. Times, Jan. -25,
1989, at A12, col. 5 (Rev. Barbara C. Harris, a black and the first woman consecrated as
Episcopal bishop). See generally R. WUTHNOW, supra note 1, at 225-35 (1988) (discussing
feminism and the impact of the women's movement on religion).
50. See, e.g., DePalma, Catholic Church Moves to Embrace Blacks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
1989, at B1, col. 2; Suro, Hispanic Shift is Changing Face of U.S. Churches, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (Traditionally Catholic, 4 million out of 20 million Hispanic
Americans now practice some form of Protestant Christianity.).
51. Cf. Roof & McKinney, Denominational America and the New Religious Pluralism,
supra note 45, at 33 ("Less and less bound to an inherited faith, the present-day believer is
able to shop around in a consumer market of religious alternatives and pick and choose
among aspects of belief and practice.").
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women's movement, has had an impact on religious institutions
and practices.2 God is now a she for some Christian worshipers. 3
Yet another sign of religious freedom in the welfare state is the
impact of organized religion on public life, for example, the contri-
bution of religion to the existence of the caring and egalitarian wel-
fare state.5 4 Black, and eventually white, clergy and churches were
instrumental in the civil rights mv ement, and thereby contributed
to passage of the Civil Rights Act o0 1964.55 Fundamentalist Chris-
tians played a major role in setting the public policy agenda in the
late 1970s and 1980s through involvement in mass media owner-
ship, religious schooling and politics.
5
Recognition of the pervasiveness and diversity of religious prac-
tice shifts the burden of proof back to Epstein. The counterargu-
ment asks Epstein to substantiate his claim by showing that the
theoretical contradiction between free religion and the welfare
state is a practical contradiction as well, and in more than a few
isolated cases. But the facts are against him. The Supreme Court
may be trapped between a rock and a hard place when it comes to
the jurisprudence of the religion clauses, but the Rock of Ages re-
mains a towering presence in the welfare state.
52. See Hargrove, Schmidt & Davaney, Religion and the Changing Role of Women, 480
ANNALS 117 (1985):
Sensitized by the civil rights movement and reflecting the rising tide of femi-
nist consciousness developing with the present-day women's movement, femi-
nist theology emerged as a distinctive theological approach during the 1970s.
Many voices have been heard, speaking from a variety of perspectives and of-
fering quite diverse proposals for this new understanding of theology and its
task.
Id. at 127.
53. See id. at 128-30 ("growing interest in a Goddess-centered vision of reality").
54. See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 1, at 321.
55. See id. at 145-46; see also C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE xvi-xx
(1985) (stressing citizen support in passage of Civil Rights Act).
56. See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 1, at 173-214.
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